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 Infrequent targets detection mainly deactivated default mode brain regions. 
 Trait worry was inversely related with prefrontal deactivation to target detection. 
 HRV predicted neural activation changes produced by attentional focus switching. 
 A worry induction increased pre- to post-target deactivation of default mode areas. 
 The induction reduced behavioural and neurobiological differences between groups. 
 
Abstract 
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is characterized by difficulties in inhibiting both perseverative 
thoughts (worry and rumination) and autonomic arousal. We investigated the neurobiological 
substrates of such abnormal inhibitory processes, hypothesizing aberrant functional coupling within 
‘default mode’ (DMN) and autonomic brain networks. Functional imaging and heart rate variability 
(HRV) data were acquired from GAD patients and controls during performance of three tracking 
tasks interspersed with a perseverative cognition (PC) induction. After detection of infrequent target 
stimuli, activity within putative DMN hubs was suppressed, consistent with a redirection of 
attentional resources from internal to external focus. This magnitude of activity change was 
attenuated in patients and individuals with higher trait PC, but was predicted by individual 
differences in HRV. Following the induction of PC in controls, this pattern of neural reactivity 
became closer to that of GAD patients. Results support, at a neural level, the association between 
cognitive inflexibility and autonomic rigidity.  
 
Key Words: Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Perseverative Cognition, Heart Rate Variability, 
FMRI, Attention  
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Introduction 
In their “autonomic flexibility-neurovisceral integration model of anxiety”, Friedman and 
Thayer (1998) view anxiety as a systemic inflexibility, grounded in poor inhibition.  Indeed, 
anxious individuals show a reduced capacity to inhibit cognitive (worry), behavioural (avoidance), 
and accompanying physiological (reduced vagal tone) manifestations. According to this model, 
vagal tone, indexed by heart rate variability (HRV) may serve as a measure of the integrity of brain 
networks that regulate inhibition through central-autonomic nervous control in the service of 
efficient functioning (Friedman, 2007).  
An earlier laboratory study applied this model to perseverative cognition (i.e., worry and 
rumination) in healthy individuals, hypothesizing a link between cognitive inflexibility and 
autonomic rigidity expressed as reduced HRV (Ottaviani, Shapiro, & Couyoumdjian, 2013).  The 
rationale for collapsing worrisome and ruminative thoughts into a single phenomenal category is 
corroborated by studies showing no differences between these two processes on their impact on 
appraisals and strategies (e.g., Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Watkins, Moulds, & 
Mackintosh, 2005) and by the incremental benefits of using perseverative cognition as a 
transdiagnostic symptom (McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013; Spinhoven, Drost, van 
Hemert, & Penninx, 2015).  In Ottaviani et al. (2013), participants performed a low-demanding 
tracking task before and after a perseverative cognition induction in which they were asked to recall 
a past or future personally relevant negative event.  The task required participants to keep the cursor 
inside a white circle in motion on a black screen and press the left mouse button as fast as possible 
each time the circle turned red.  Reaction times were used as an objective index of cognitive 
rigidity.  At different time intervals, probes interrupted the task to inquire about subjects’ moods 
and thoughts.  Whenever subjects reported worrying about a future event, or ruminating about a 
past stressful event, they were asked how much they experienced the thought as intrusive and how 
much they were trying to suppress it (subjective measures of cognitive rigidity).  HRV was 
monitored throughout the task as an index of autonomic flexibility. Worry and rumination were 
	 Ͷ
expressed along attentional (slower reaction times), cognitive (efforts to inhibit intrusive thoughts), 
affective (mood worsening), and autonomic (lower HRV) dimensions.  In line with Friedman and 
Thayer’s model (1998), the cognitive inflexibility that characterized perseverative cognition was 
mirrored, at a physiological level, by autonomic rigidity. Two 24-hours ambulatory studies replicate 
these findings in healthy (Ottaviani et al., 2015a) and depressed participants (Ottaviani et al., 
2015b). 
The present study aimed to extend these results by defining neural substrates of the cognitive 
rigidity that characterizes perseverative cognition using the same task and induction procedure in an 
fMRI environment with simultaneous cardiac monitoring.  HRV was derived to test, at a neural 
level, the association with autonomic rigidity.  Importantly, we examined these effects in both 
healthy participants and patients with GAD, a clinical population that has perseverative cognition as 
a core symptom.  The simultaneous assessment of bodily reactions and cognitive processes is 
particularly needed when studying generalized anxiety, where changes in autonomic nervous 
function, such as palpitations or sweating, can drive negative cognitions creating a vicious cycle 
that plays a major role in the maintenance of the disorder. 
The integration of cognitive and affective neuroscience with clinical autonomic research has 
advanced our understanding of the neurobiology of GAD and related anxiety disorders.  Anxiety is 
associated with aberrant (often exaggerated) functional activation of brain regions normally 
engaged in response to motivational salient stimuli and demanding behavioural challenges. These 
same brain regions are also implicated in the generation (e.g. anterior cingulate cortex), 
representation (e.g. insular cortex) or both (e.g. amygdala) of autonomic states of arousal 
(Critchley, Eccles, & Garfinkel, 2013).  These studies are informed by observations in patients with 
clinical perturbations in autonomic response (e.g., Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2002) and recent 
studies illustrating how neural responses to feedback from the heart can dynamically shape the 
perception and processing of threat and safety (reviewed in Garfinkel & Critchley, 2016). 
Unfortunately, no published studies examining perseverative cognition in GAD have combined 
	 ͷ
neuroimaging techniques with concurrent measures of peripheral autonomic nervous activity.  In 
fact, to our knowledge, only two published studies directly investigated the brain correlates of 
worry in GAD patients.  One of them had a small sample size (n = 6 patients) and the absence of a 
comparison group as strong limitations (Hoehn-Saric, Schlund, & Wong, 2004).  Although difficult 
to generalize, patients showed enhanced activation of frontal and anterior cingulate (ACC) cortices 
in response to worrisome sentences (Hoehn-Saric et al., 2004).  The second suggested that worry 
induction engaged the same neural system in both GAD and healthy individuals (Paulesu et al., 
2010). Activity within ACC and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) was enhanced by worry 
inducing sentences in both GAD patients and controls but, interestingly, GAD patients also showed 
a sustained activation of these areas during resting state scans that followed the worrying induction 
phase.  In line with a dimensional view of psychopathology, this persistent activation correlated 
with dispositional tendencies to worry assessed by the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990).  
Overall there is need for greater neurobiological understanding of difficulties in inhibiting 
perseverative thoughts and autonomic dysregulation in GAD, perceived as uncontrollable and 
disruptive to patients’ daily life.  We therefore undertook a neuroimaging study, acquiring fMRI 
and concomitant HRV data from GAD patients and healthy controls.  Participants performed 
repetitions of a low-demand tracking task.  This task promoted occurrence of self-generated 
thoughts, and the degree to which these thoughts distracted participants from the task could be 
measured by examining pre- to post-infrequent targets brain activation patterns. 
‘Spontaneous’ (i.e. task-free) brain activity in functional imaging experiments is no longer 
simply viewed as noise or a confound to be controlled (e.g., Binder et al., 1999).  This motivated 
our analytical approach: periods of low cognitive, emotional, or sensory demand (as in our pre-
target epochs), reliably enhance activity across a specific network of regions proposed to support 
the brain’s default mode (Raichle et al., 2001).  The key emergent property of DMN activation is 
the production of self-generated thoughts or mind wandering (Mason et al., 2007).  When a task 
	 ͸
requires our attention, however, the activation of such network is suppressed (as in our post-target 
epochs).  Deficits in DMN suppression are reported in several mental illnesses, notably anxiety 
disorders (Anticevic et al., 2012).  This observation suggests that difficulties in switching from rest 
to task are linked to specific symptomatology, e.g. impaired attention and worry (Forster et al., 
2015).  In line with this approach, instead of looking at what happens while participants perform a 
task, it can be more informative to compare periods of resting activity before and after infrequent 
target occurrence.  The concept of task-rest interactions acknowledges the modulation of resting 
brain activation by the preceding stimulus-induced activation or vice-versa (Northoff et al., 2010).  
Thus, 15 s periods immediately preceding experience sampling probes were used to demonstrate 
activation of DMN regions during mind wandering (Christoff et al. 2009).  Post-stimulus alteration 
in neural activity is dissociable from stimuli-evoked neural responses (Mullinger et al., 2013). 
Between repetitions of the task, we included an induction of perseverative cognition to increase 
the likelihood of worry and rumination.  From here on, the use of “self-generated thoughts” will 
indicate thoughts that are unrelated to the immediate external environment (i.e., the ongoing task) 
and are internally-driven (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014).  Self-generated thoughts can take the form 
of perseverative cognition in GAD or –in healthy individuals– after an experimental induction.  The 
term  “attentional control” will be conversely used to indicate moments in which participants’ 
attention is on the task (i.e., externally-oriented). 
At a behavioural level, we expected to replicate previous findings (Ottaviani et al., 2013) 
showing that reaction times are delayed and HRV is reduced following induction, due to an increase 
in rumination and worry.  Within the brain, we hypothesized that enhanced self-referential 
processing (at baseline in GAD and following the perseverative cognition induction in HC) is 
associated with increased engagement of the default mode network which in turn accounts for 
difficulties in focusing on the tracking task (i.e., levels of default mode network de-activation at 
target appearance).  To inform our understanding of HRV as a putative marker for neural processes 
involved in maladaptive cognition (Thayer, Ahs, Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012), we tested if 
	 ͹
higher levels of HRV predict better ability to deactivate the default mode network during the 
transition from internal thoughts to task-focused behaviour.  
 
Methods and Materials 
Participants 
We recruited 40 individuals to take part in the study, which was approved by the National 
Research Ethics Service (NRES) for the National Health Service (NHS) with university sponsorship 
granted via the Brighton and Sussex Medical School Research Governance and Ethics Committee.  
Participants were compensated for their time.  One GAD subject had to be excluded from the 
analyses because of missing data.  The final sample was composed of 19 individuals who met 
diagnostic criteria for generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; 17 women, 2 men; mean age ± S.D. = 
29.6 ± 6.9 years) and 20 healthy controls (17 women, 3 men; mean age = 28.7 ± 9.5 years).  Only 1 
participant was non-Caucasian.  Patients were recruited from public advertisement and from Access 
and Recovery Services clinics of Sussex Partnership NHS (Mental Health) Foundation Trust.  
Healthy control participants were recruited by advertisement from staff and students of the 
University of Sussex, and Brighton and Sussex Medical School.  All participants were right-handed, 
native English speakers, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Exclusionary criteria were: age younger than 18 years, prior history of head injury, major 
medical neurological or psychiatric disorder (other than GAD and co-morbid depression for the 
patient group), cognitive impairment, history of substance or alcohol abuse or dependence, 
diagnosis of heart disease, obesity (body mass index > 30kg/m2), pregnancy, claustrophobia or 
other general MRI exclusions.  The exclusion of co-morbid psychiatric disorders other than 
depression was due to: a) the knowledge that the psychiatric diagnosis occurring most often in 
comorbidity with GAD is major depressive disorder (e.g., Beesdo et al., 2010); b) the need to have 
an –as much as possible- unmedicated sample; c) the focus of the paper on poor inhibition as a key 
factor in anxiety and the need to exclude confounding variables in drawing our conclusions (i.e., 
	 ͺ
our hypotheses were driven by previous data on autonomic and neural correlates of generalized 
anxiety disorder without considering the effects of other comorbid disorders). 
Two GAD participants were included who use long-term medications (1 citalopram, 1 
pregabalin) at the time of the study.  All other patients and controls were medication free.  All 
participants provided written informed consent.  
 
Procedure 
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-V (SCID) was administered by a trained 
postdoctoral fellow (FM) to both patient and controls to confirm/exclude the diagnosis of GAD and 
comorbid disorders. Participants then completed a series of online socio-demographic and 
dispositional traits questionnaires.  Participants were subsequently familiarized with the 
neuroimaging environment, connected to the physiological recording equipment, and then 
underwent the fMRI protocol.  
 
Questionnaires 
All participants completed a set of questionnaires accessing socio-demographic, and lifestyle 
(nicotine, alcohol, and caffeine consumption, physical activity) information.   
Dispositional perseverative cognition was assessed by: 
1) Stress-Reactive Rumination Scale (SRRS; Robinson & Alloy, 2003), a measure of the 
tendency to engage in perseverative cognition after stressful events. The scale was designed to 
measure rumination in a manner that is not confounded with depressive symptoms, a limitation of 
many other self-report perseverative cognition scales (Robinson & Alloy, 2003). The scale has the 
following subscales: Negative Inferential Style, Hopelessness, and Active Problem-Solving. 
2) Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990), a 16-item self-report 
questionnaire commonly used to measure pathological worry in both clinical and non-clinical 
populations.  Respondents report how true each statement is for them on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
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not at all typical of me, 5 = very typical of me).  The PSWQ has shown good-to-excellent internal 
consistency (αs = .86 - .93 across clinical and college samples; Molina & Borkovec, 1994) and 
good discriminant validity (i.e., discriminates GAD from other anxiety disorders; Brown, Antony, 
& Barlow, 1992).  
To better characterize the sample from a clinical point of view, levels of state and trait anxiety 
(State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983) and depression (Beck Depression 
Inventory, BDI; Beck et al., 1988) were also assessed (see Makovac et al., 2015 for further details). 
 
Experimental Task and Design  
While in the scanner, participants performed a series of three 6-min easy visuomotor tracking 
tasks interspersed by four 5-min resting state periods. The first and last runs were resting state runs. 
There were no time intervals between subsequent runs, and the next run began as soon as the 
participant completed the visuo-analogue scales (VASs; see the section below) at the end of the 
preceding run. 
The tracking task (adapted from Ottaviani et al., 2013) required participants to follow a white 
circle moving slowly and horizontally on the screen and to press a button as fast as possible each 
time the circle turned red.  The duration of the red circle (target) was 100 ms after which the circle 
returned to white and the task continued.  For each target, accuracy and reaction times were 
recorded.  The circle made six transits of about a minute each.  Targets were presented at random 
intervals: there were a total of 9 targets with a maximum of 2 targets (at least 20 sec apart) per 
transit.  The level of difficulty was very low, to increase the likelihood of episodes of perseverative 
cognition.  Randomly, prior to either the second or third performance of the tracking task 
participants underwent a verbal induction procedure designed to engender perseverative negative 
cognition.  Participants were randomised according to when the induction occurred to permit 
control of temporal order effects.  The induction took the form of a recorded verbal instruction 
delivered to the participant as follows: 
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“Next I would like you to recall an episode that happened in the past year that made you feel 
sad, anxious, or stressed, or something that may happen in the future that worries you.  
Then, I would like you to think about this episode in detail, for example about its possible 
causes, consequences, and your feelings about it.  Please keep thinking about this until the 
end of the next tracking task.  Thank you.  Please take as much time as you need to recall the 
episode and press the button whenever you are ready”. 
This type of induction has been widely used and proved to be effective in eliciting 
perseverative cognition in healthy and pathological subjects (Ottaviani et al., 2016 for a meta-
analysis). 
 
Visual analogue scales (VAS) 
After each tracking task (and resting state run), to assess state levels of perseverative 
cognition over the preceding period, participants were asked about their thoughts, using VASs.  
The participants were asked to rate on separate 100-point VASs “how much, for the duration 
of the task, they were”: 1) focused on the task?; 2) distracted by external stimuli?; 3) 
ruminating/worrying?; and 4) distracted by internal thoughts?.  
 
Physiological data processing 
Heartbeats were monitored using MRI-compatible finger pulse oximetry (8600FO; Nonin 
Medical).  The analog physiological signals were digitized at 1000 Hz using a CED 1401 analog-to-
digital converter (Cambridge Electronic Design) and analysed using Spike 2 software (Cambridge 
Electronic Design). Each signal epoch was manually checked and corrected for artefacts.   As the 
root mean square successive difference (RMSSD) has been demonstrated to be a reliable parameter 
for assessing vagus-mediated HRV from very short (down to 10 s) heart rate recordings (e.g., 
Nussinovitch et al., 2011), HR and RMSSD were obtained for each task epoch using RHRV 4.0 
(http://rhrv.r-forge.r-project.org).  As recommended, HRV data was converted to natural logarithms 
	 ͳͳ
(lnHRV).   
 
MRI acquisition and image pre-processing 
All images were acquired on a 1.5-Tesla Siemens Magnetom Avanto scanner.  Blood 
oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signals were recorded using spin echo sequence, 34 slices, 
slice thickness 3 mm, Inter-slice gap 0.6 mm, voxel size 3 x 3 x 3 mm, TR 2520 ms, TE 43 ms.  
For the fMRI pre-processing the first four volumes were discarded to allow the stabilisation of 
longitudinal magnetization.  Pre-processing was conducted using FSL (FMRIB Software Library, 
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl).  Motion correction was conducted using FMRIB’s Linear Registration 
Tool (MCFLIRT; Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002; Jenkinson & Smith, 2001).  Slice 
timing correction, spatial smoothing with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm (FWHM), and high pass 
temporal filtering (cut-off full-width 100 sec) to remove low-frequency drift were applied.  The EPI 
data was then registered to the individual’s high-resolution structural scan using the Boundary-
Based Registration (BBR) algorithm.  Registration to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
standard space was then implemented using FNIRT (FMRIB’s non-linear registration tool) 
nonlinear registration. 
 
Statistical Analyses  
Questionnaire, behavioural, and HRV analyses 
All data are expressed as means ± SD.  Differences at p ≤ 0.05 are regarded as significant.  
Data analyses were performed with SPSS 22.0 for Windows (SPSS Inc., USA). 
Analyses on pre-existing group differences and the effects of the induction at a behavioural 
(RTs), subjective (VAS), and physiological (RMSSD) level are described elsewhere, although on a 
slightly different sample size (Makovac et al., 2015).  For clarity purposes, however, the main 
findings will be summarized in the Results section. 
To examine the role of HRV as a marker for cognitive rigidity, Pearson correlations were 
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performed between baseline HRV and change scores in perseverative cognition from pre- to post-
induction. 
  
fMRI data analysis 
All 1st Level and Higher Level analyses were performed using FEAT Version 6.0, part of FSL 
(FMRIB's Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.ul/fsl). 
 
First-level analyses 
BOLD response was modelled using two explanatory variables; the first represented a 15 s pre-
target period (proxy of internally-oriented attention) and the second a 15 s post-target period (proxy 
of task-oriented attention).   We opted for 15 s in light of past evidence showing that the mean 
duration of each mind-wandering episode is about 14 s (Klinger, 1978). Our approach is consistent 
with previous work that, despite the lack of knowledge as to how long participants had actually 
been in a particular mind-wandering state, based the analyses on the assumption that the 15 s prior 
to each target/probe would consistently fall within that mind-wandering state on average (e.g., He et 
al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 2008).  The appearance of infrequent targets is supposed to force 
participants to go back on task whereas, given the monotony of the task and the infrequency of 
target appearance, periods immediately prior to the latter are likely to be characterized by 
internally-oriented attention (e.g., Smallwood, 2011).  The tracking task used in the present study 
has proven to be effective in eliciting episodes of mind wandering (before induction) and 
perseverative cognition (after induction) in healthy individuals (Ottaviani et al., 2013). 
These were used for the 1st Level FEAT analysis.  For each explanatory variable, the regressor 
was convolved with a gamma function to produce an expected BOLD response.  The temporal 
derivative of this time-course was also included in the analytic model for each variable to capture 
temporal shifts.  Two contrasts were tested: pre-target activation greater than post-target activation 




After analysing the tracking tasks before and after the induction for each subject, data were 
passed into a higher-level analysis, which allowed within- and between-groups comparisons. The 
interspersed resting-state periods go beyond the focus of the present work and will be excluded 
from the analyses.  Higher-level analyses were carried out using FLAME (FMRIB’s Local Analysis 
of Mixed Effects), such that group-level effects were modelled using random effects.  Z-statistics 
images were threshold based upon clusters determined by z > 2.3 and a (corrected) cluster 
significance threshold of p < 0.05.  Models were created to examine the following properties: 
1. Main effect of GROUP (GAD vs HC); 
2. Main effect of INDUCTION (Before vs After); 
3. GROUP x INDUCTION interaction. 
For visualization purposes, the coefficients of parameter estimates for regions that showed 
significant activation differences in these contrasts were extracted and plotted. 
In addition to the above analyses, to explore individual differences in cognitive functioning and 
brain activation, specific correlational analyses were undertaken.  These tested for association 
between key physiological and behavioural measures and neural activity.  Variables of interest were 
SRRS (tendency to engage in perseverative cognition) and HRV.  These were modelled as 
explanatory variables in whole brain regression analyses.  Separate analyses were performed for 
pre- and post-induction blocks for HRV. 
Outliers were controlled for, using automatic outlier de-weighting in FSL.  This tool 
automatically detects outlier data points (for each voxel, each participant’s data is considered with 
respect to the others to determine if it is an outlier).  Outliers are then automatically de-weighted in 
the multi-participant statistics.  All fMRI data shown were cluster-corrected for multiple 
comparison at z > 2.3, p < 0.05. For visualization purposes, coefficients of parameter estimates for 
	 ͳͶ
regions that showed significant correlations with the physiological and behavioural variables were 




No group differences for any of the assessed socio-demographic and lifestyle variables 
emerged, therefore these were not included as covariates in the subsequent analyses (see Makovac 
et al., 2015).  GAD participants had higher (and pathological) scores on the PSWQ (69.1 ± 8.2 vs 
42.6 ± 13.4, t (38) = 7.02, p < 0.001) and the SRRS (1398 ± 263 vs 983 ± 238), t (38) = 4.92, p < 
0.001) compared to controls. Levels of trait anxiety were significantly higher in the GAD group 
(55.2 ± 8.8 vs 35.8 ± 9.4, t (38) = 7.01, p < 0.001) compared to controls.  According to Beck & 
Steer (1984) cut-offs, GAD participants reported mild-to-moderate levels of depression (16.1 ± 
10.2), whereas the control group was in the no-depression range (4.1 ± 4.9), t (38) = 4.81, p < 
0.001. 
 
Induction effect at a behavioural, cognitive and physiological level 
After the perseverative cognition induction, all participants were less focused on task (F(1,38) = 
22.2; p < .0001), more distracted by internal thought (F(1,38) = 30.44; p < .0001) and less 
distracted by external stimuli (F(1,38) = 8.46; p = .01), engaged more in rumination and worry 
(F(1,38) = 82.02; p < .0001), and had an overall increase in reaction times (F(1,38) = 21.14; p < 
.0001) suggesting difficulties in disengaging thoughts.  The task was too easy to allow for accuracy 
analysis.  Particularly, GAD patients had a stronger loss of attentional focus compared to controls as 
shown by the Induction X Group interaction (F(1,38) = 6.32; p < .0001) and significant post hoc 
comparisons (t(18) = 5.60; p < .0001).  Moreover, GAD patients had an overall lower HRV then 




HRV as a marker for cognitive rigidity 
Significant correlations were found between baseline (pre-induction) HRV (61.4 ± 38.9 ms2) 
and pre- to post-induction change scores in levels of perseverative cognition (assessed by the VAS 
“ruminating/worrying?”; Δ = 40.3 ± 38.5), suggesting a higher increase in perseverative cognition 
in participants with lower HRV (r = -0.33; p = 0.04). 
 
Neurobiological substrates of the transition from spontaneous self-generated thoughts to 
attentional control 
The detection of infrequent targets deactivated brain regions primarily attributed to the default 
mode network.  Across groups, discounting induction effects, target presentation elicited decreases 
in activation (Pretgt > Posttgt) in regions of the left precuneus, postcentral gyrus and Heschl’s Gyrus, 
and, bilaterally, regions of the precentral gyrus, juxtapositional lobule cortex, lateral occipital 
cortex, and occipital pole (Table 1a, Figure 1A1).  Increased activation following target presentation 
(Posttgt > Pretgt) was noted in Crus I and Crus II of the left cerebellum (Table 1b, Figure 1A2). 
 
Neurobiological substrates of abnormal inhibitory processes following the induction 
A significant main effect of Induction and a Group x Induction interaction were shown: Both 
occurred for the Pretgt > Posttgt contrast.  No supratheshold main effect of Group was observed. 
The induction altered neural responses from pre- to post-target appearance (Pretgt > Posttgt) in 
areas of the frontal pole (bilaterally), superior frontal gyrus (right), and paracingulate gyrus (right) 
(see Table 2, Figure 1B).  Examination of the coefficient of parameter estimate (COPE) values from 
a regional mask encompassing these regions showed that target appearance evoked a greater 
reduction in activation post induction, compared to pre induction (Figure 1B1). 
A Group x Induction interaction (Pretgt > Posttgt) was evident within precuneus (bilateral), 
lateral occipital gyrus (right), and posterior cingulate gyrus (bilateral) (see Table 3).  Examination 
	 ͳ͸
of the COPE estimates for a regional mask based on this interaction indicated that, after the 
induction, the activation patterns of the two groups tended to converge.  The significant interaction 
was driven by a stronger reduction of activation in healthy individuals after target presentation from 
pre- to post-induction while, in the GAD group, this reduction was already evident before induction 
(Figure 1C).  
 
Additional analysis of target occurrence 
To confirm that the reported findings reflected the properties of transition between attentional 
states rather than target detection, a follow-up event-related analysis using the target presentation 
times as the events and event length as length of target display (i.e. 500 msec) was conducted. Pre-
induction, there was a main effect of group, the HC group displayed greater activation than GAD in 
a cluster located in the right frontal pole (zmax = 3.96, MNI coordinates 26,56,6; z > 2.3, cluster 
corrected p < 0.05; Online Supplement Table 1). This effect was absent in the post-induction 
analysis. Neither a main effect of Induction nor a Group x Induction interaction emerged from this 
analysis further supporting the view that the above results do not reflect target detection per se 
(Online Supplement Fig. 1). 
 
Individual differences in trait perseverative cognition and inhibitory processes 
Correlational analyses were undertaken to examine relationships between neural responses 
from pre- to post-target appearance and SRRS.  Both contrasts (Pretgt > Posttgt and Posttgt > Pretgt) 
were tested. In both groups, scores on the SRRS were significantly associated with the shift in 
activation following the induction (Figure 1B2).  More precisely, after the induction participants 
with higher dispositional tendencies to engage in perseverative cognition showed less deactivation 
within frontal pole regions at target presentation compared to low-trait SRRS individuals suggesting 
difficulties in disengaging thoughts. 
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Individual differences in HRV and inhibitory processes 
Individual differences in HRV predicted the capacity for neural activity to shift from an 
internally-directed pattern supporting perseverative negative thoughts, to activity associated with 
control of externally-directed attention.  HRV correlated negatively with both pre- and post-
induction decreases in neural responses evoked by target presentation (Pretgt > Posttgt).  In other 
words, as HRV decreased, the magnitude of activation changes brought about by target detection 
increased.  Before induction, HRV correlated with target-induced deactivation within right superior 
parietal lobule, supramarginal gyrus and superior frontal gyrus (Table 4a, Figure 2a).  Following the 
induction, HRV negatively correlated with target-induced decreased activity bilaterally within 
central and parietal opercular cortices and precentral and postcentral gyri (Table 4b, Figure 2b). 
HRV did not correlate with target-related changes in activity before induction. However, 
following the induction, a negative correlation was noted for regions that encompassed right middle 
and inferior temporal gyri and Crus I and Crus II regions of the cerebellum:  As HRV increased, 
there was less activation in these regions from pre- to post-target appearance (Figure 2c).  
 
Discussion  
Combining neuroimaging techniques with peripheral physiology monitoring provides insight 
into brain-body interactions and the integration of autonomic, affective, and cognitive processes 
(Critchley, 2009).  To our knowledge, this is the first functional imaging study in which 
simultaneous neuroimaging and autonomic recording were used to investigate difficulties in 
inhibiting perseverative thoughts and autonomic arousal, the most pervasive symptoms of GAD.  
We first examined the brain areas associated with the transition from spontaneous self-generated 
thoughts to attentional control during a low-demanding task in GAD and healthy participants.  
Second, we studied the consequences of a perseverative cognition induction on this shift from 
internally- to externally-oriented attention.  Then, we tested if the effects of the induction on this 
attentional shift could be predicted by dispositional tendencies to engage in perseverative cognition 
	 ͳͺ
(scores on the SRRS).  Lastly, we examined the association between HRV and brain activation 
changes during the transition from internal thoughts to task focusing. 
The neural responses elicited by target appearance were principally expressed as a relative 
deactivation rather than activation within specific brain regions.  This was particularly the case for 
regions which form part of the default mode network, including the precuneus, which is implicated 
in episodic memory, visuospatial processing, self-reflection and aspects of consciousness (Fox, 
Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-Hanna, & Christoff, 2015; Hannawi, Lindquist, Caffo, Sair, & Stevens, 
2015; Kwok & Macaluso, 2015).  Target appearance also attenuated activity within motor, auditory, 
and somatosensory areas, putatively reflecting the rich multisensory nature of internal thoughts 
(e.g., Fox, Nijeboer, Solomonova, Domhoff, & Christoff, 2013; Hasenkamp et al., 2012).  Perhaps 
surprisingly, we did not find target-related changes within default mode network regions, notably 
posterior cingulate cortex, which is also linked to self-referential thoughts and worry (e.g., 
Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Paulesu et al., 2010).  Present results are, 
however, consistent with a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies, which concluded that 
default mode activation alone is insufficient to capture fully the neural basis of spontaneous thought 
(Fox et al., 2015).  Also, in the present study we sought to address the concept of cognitive 
“flexibility” by specifically targeting transitions from internal thoughts to externally oriented 
attention, and therefore focused on a different research question compared to studies directly 
comparing brain correlates of worrisome and neutral thoughts (e.g., Hoehn-Saric et al., 2004; 
Paulesu et al., 2010). 
We replicated the effects of a perseverative cognition induction (e.g., Ottaviani, Shapiro, & 
Fitzgerald, 2011; Ottaviani & Shapiro, 2011) on target detection performance, showing decreased 
focus on the task and slower reaction times to target appearance indicative of difficulties in getting 
out of a state of heighted focus on ruminative and worrisome thoughts (Franklin, Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2011; Ottaviani et al., 2013).  Moreover, baseline HRV was associated with pre-to post-
induction changes in perseverative cognition, confirming the previously reported association 
	 ͳͻ
between cognitive inflexibility and autonomic rigidity (Ottaviani et al., 2013; 2015a,b). 
In line with the notion that worry in GAD is likely to be more quantitatively than qualitatively 
different from normal worry (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004), the 
induction increased the amount of perseverative negative thoughts in controls up to an equivalent 
level reported by GAD patients, making the two groups more similar.   
Our implementation of an induction procedure extended what has been previously observed on 
changes in brain activity: an earlier study reported that worry-inducing sentences, enhances the 
activity within medial prefrontal cortices when compared to neutral sentences in both GAD patients 
and controls (Paulesu et al., 2010).  We observed an increase in activity after induction within 
frontal pole, superior frontal gyrus, and paracingulate gyrus, regions implicated in self-referential 
processing and introspection.  These regions decreased their responses to target appearance 
suggesting a role in self-related mental imagery.  Induction amplified the pre-target engagement of 
these regions in perseverative cognition, particularly in healthy controls since it is likely that in 
GAD patients this effect was already present before the induction.  Thus, the induction had the 
effect to make the two groups more similar both at a behavioural and at a neural level. These 
findings extend to anxiety disorder previous observations from pathological worriers (Ottaviani et 
al., 2014) and patients with major depression (Ottaviani et al., 2015b). 
A dimensional approach to psychopathological symptoms was further supported by the finding 
that scores on a continuous measure of dispositional perseverative cognition (SRRS) also predicted 
these effects of induction on prefrontal areas activation.  High trait participants were characterized 
by less prefrontal deactivation at target appearance after the induction compared to low trait 
participants.  Though focusing on worry, a similar relationship has been found between scores on 
the PSWQ and sustained activation of the medial frontal region after worry-induction (Paulesu et 
al., 2010).  Together, these findings converge to suggest that these brain areas mediate the link 
between perseverative cognition and both the anticipation of threat and the lack of recovery from 
threat.  
	 ʹͲ
Participants with lower pre-induction HRV were characterized by stronger activation changes 
in areas such as the superior parietal lobule, supramarginal gyrus, and superior frontal gyrus, all 
critically important for the manipulation of information in working memory (du Boisgueheneuc et 
al., 2006; Koenigs, Barbey, Postle, & Grafman, 2009), spontaneous thought processes (Fox et al., 
2015), and the dynamic switch between external and internal modes of attention (Andrews-Hanna, 
Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014).  This is a counterintuitive result, as one may expect higher (and not 
lower) HRV to index a better ability to switch from internally-oriented to externally-oriented 
attention, and hence be associated with stronger deactivation in such areas.  Nevertheless, 
participants with lower HRV (GAD patients in our sample) are likely to engage in more 
perseverative cognition compared to those with higher HRV.  Thus, larger changes (i.e., stronger 
deactivation of these areas at target appearance) would be entirely due to baseline differences.  This 
is supported by the significant correlation between baseline HRV and pre-to post-induction changes 
in perseverative cognition, consistent with established relationships between HRV and performance 
on cognitive tasks under threat conditions (Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2003, Hansen, Johnsen, & 
Thayer, 2009). 
Interestingly, pre- and post-induction associations implicated different regions, suggesting that 
HRV is able to predict differences in brain activity during both “normal” mind wandering and 
dysfunctional perseverative cognition.  Whereas before the induction, HRV was associated with 
activity principally within working memory areas, after the induction lower levels of HRV were 
correlated with a stronger deactivation of somatosensory areas (postcentral gyrus, parietal 
operculum), reflecting the idea that perseverative cognition is akin to being more immersed in 
imagined situations.  Future fMRI studies directly comparing functional and dysfunctional forms of 
repetitive thinking are needed to clarify if mind wandering and perseverative cognition can be 
differentiated by the degree to which they recruit attentional or salience-related brain networks, 
respectively.  
When we looked at post-induction activation patterns, participants with lower HRV levels 
	 ʹͳ
expressed higher activation within the cerebellum and the inferior temporal gyri. The cerebellum is 
certainly involved in physiological regulation as a component of the central autonomic network 
(Spyer, 1999) contributing to the control of cardiovascular responses through its connections with 
the hypothalamus (Critchley, Corfield, Chandler, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000). Accordingly, 
covariation is observed between HRV and the cerebellum (Critchley et al. 2003; Gianaros, Van Der 
Veen, & Jennings, 2004; Lane et al., 2009; Napadow et al., 2008). 
The temporal lobe regions are associated with counterfactual reasoning (Van Hoeck et al., 
2014), including retrieving, reliving and elaborating past events (conscious episodic memory al 
(Andreasen et al., 1999; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007) and imagining potential futures 
(Summerfield, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2010; Weiler, Suchan, & Daum, 2010).  Our data raise the 
intriguing notion that there may be physiological constraints on counterfactual thought. Low tonic 
levels of HRV might indicate a predisposition to keep on ‘erring on the side of caution’ (Gerin et 
al., 2013) reflected in perseverative thinking on the psychological level.  Here, we provided the first 
evidence for brain areas mediating this relationship by bridging the central autonomic and the 
cingulo-opercular networks.   
Our findings add to knowledge regarding HRV as a potential marker of stress and health 
(Thayer et al., 2012), shedding light into the still unexplained relationship between anxiety 
disorders and cardiovascular risk (see Player and Peterson, 2011 for a review).  Considering that 
perseverative cognition is one of the most difficult symptoms to treat in anxiety, our results may 
also have important implications for therapy.  HRV is a significant predictor of treatment response 
and remission from major depression (Chambers and Allen, 2002; Jain et al., 2014), and HRV 
biofeedback is a promising tool for the treatment of mood disorder (Karavidas et al., 2007). Our 
results argue for the extension of these pilot intervention studies to anxiety disorders.  Moreover, in 
a research domain, our results suggest HRV is a useful tool to detect and index perseverative 
cognition without interrupting or interfering with free thinking.  Given that spontaneity is a key 
feature of intrusive thoughts, future investigations may increase ecological validity by triggering 
	 ʹʹ
thought probes based on the physiological (i.e., HRV) changes of study participants. 
We acknowledge that the statistical power of our study will likely improve with a larger sample 
size.  A second limitation is that the occurrence of perseverative cognition while participants are not 
focusing on a task could only be assumed.  To reduce this bias, we chose an induction manipulation 
that has been extensively proven to be effective in eliciting worrisome and ruminative thoughts.  
Moreover, an increase in these types of thoughts from pre- to post-induction was testified by self-
report measures (VAS). Limitations notwithstanding, our findings highlight the dynamic 
relationship between mind and body by identifying neural substrates that shape aberrant cognitions 
in anxiety through psychophysiological interaction with autonomic bodily state.  An integrative 
investigative approach is called for to better inform therapeutic interventions, combining techniques 
including functional brain imaging and detailed autonomic monitoring, and drawing on both basic 
research and clinical observations. 
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Figure 1. A1. Brain regions exhibiting reductions in BOLD signal from pre- to post-target 
appearance (Pretgt > Posttgt; z < 2.3, cluster corrected p < 0.05) across groups.  A2. Brain regions 
exhibiting increases in BOLD signal from pre- to post-target appearance (Posttgt > Pretgt; z < 2.3, 
cluster corrected p < 0.05) across groups. B. Brain regions showing a main effect of Induction 
(Pretgt > Posttgt; z > 2.3, cluster corrected p < 0.05). B1. Main effect of Induction (median COPE 
value within activation mask).  B2. Correlation between contrast estimates in prefrontal area and 
trait rumination (SRRS scores). C. Brain regions showing significant Group x Induction effect on 
BOLD activation signal (Pretgt > Posttgt; z < 2.3, cluster corrected at p < 0.05).  Group by Induction 
Interaction Effect: Cope estimates inside activation mask  (median values).  The embedded graph 
shows the Group by Induction Interaction Effect (median COPE value within activation mask). 
 
Figure 2.  Pre- (A) and post-induction (B) correlations between changes in BOLD signal from pre- 
to post-target appearance (Pretgt > Posttgt) and HRV.  C. Correlation between change in BOLD 
signal from pre- to post-target appearance (Pretgt < Posttgt) and HRV.  Embedded graphs show the 
relationships between brain region activation changes at target appearance (median COPE value 







































































































































Table 1.  Maxima of regions showing a significant (z > 2.3, cluster corrected at p < 0.05) main 
effect of Target for Pretgt > Posttgt (a) and Posttgt > Pretgt (b) contrasts across groups. 
 
Contrast Z x y z Hemisphere Region of activation 
(a) Pretgt > Posttgt 4.27 -38 -22 52 Left PreCentral Gyrus 
 3.9 10 -12 62 Right Juxtapositional Lobule Cortex
 3.44 12 -16 72 Right PreCentral Gyrus 
 3.42 -8 -4 66 Left Juxtapositional Lobule Cortex
 3.35 -36 -12 58 Left PreCentral Gyrus 
 3.3 -18 -14 58 Left PreCentral Gyrus 
 3.52 -38 -70 4 Left Lateral Occipital Cortex 
 3.01 -42 -28 22 Left Parietal Operculum Cortex 
 2.99 -12 -50 16 Left Precuneus 
 2.97 -38 -28 22 Left Parietal Operculum Cortex 
 2.95 -10 -66 20 Left Precuneus 
 2.88 -30 -94 -6 Left Occipital Pole 
 3.93 44 -88 -4 Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 
 3.69 36 -96 10 Right Occipital Pole 
 3.46 40 -90 6 Right Occipital Pole 
 3.31 32 -84 -2 Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 
 3.13 42 -62 -8 Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 
 3.04 44 -68 -4 Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 
(b) Posttgt > Pretgt 4.02 -46 -56 -38 Left Cerebellum Crus I 
 3.89 -40 -66 -44 Left Cerebellum Crus II 
	 ͵ͷ
 3.38 -12 -90 -24 Left Cerebellum Crus I 
 3.17 -34 -82 -28 Left Cerebellum Crus I 
 3.12 -16 -86 -22 Left Cerebellum Crus I 




Table 2.  Maxima of regions showing a significant (z > 2.3, cluster corrected at p < 0.05) main 
effect of Induction (before vs after) across groups. 
 
Z x y z Hemisphere Region of activation 
4.22 12 56 22 Right Frontal Pole 
3.56 -14 56 26 Left Frontal Pole 
3.55 8 42 38 Right Superior Frontal Gyrus 
3.51 8 44 34 Right Superior Frontal Gyrus 
3.06 18 28 34 Right Superior Frontal Gyrus 




Table 3.  Maxima of regions showing a significant (z > 2.3, cluster corrected at p < 0.05) Group 
(GAD vs HC) by Induction (before vs after) interaction. 
 
Z x y z Hemisphere Region of activation 
3.71 30 -72 52 Right Lateral Occipital Gyrus 
3.65 -6 -54 60 Left Precuneus 
3.36 36 -66 52 Right Lateral Occipital Gyrus 
3.33 12 -74 36 Right Precuneus 
3.3 16 -70 38 Right Precuneus 




Table 4. Maxima of regions showing a significant negative correlation (Pretgt > Posttgt) with  
ln(HRV) pre and post induction. 
 
Contrast Z x y z Hemisphere Region of activation 
(a) Pretgt > Posttgt pre-induction 3.89 44 -46 62 Right Superior Parietal Lobule 
 3.74 38 -46 50 Right Superior Parietal Lobule 
 3.72 34 -10 38 Right Precentral Gyrus 
 3.22 56 -34 60 Right Supramarginal Gyrus 
 3.18 18 2 60 Right Superior Frontal Gyrus 
 3.11 52 -34 58 Right Supramarginal Gyrus 
(b) Pretgt > Posttgt post-induction 4.41 -58 -6 6 Left Central Opercular Cortex 
 4.34 -52 -8 8 Left Central Opercular Cortex 
 4.27 -50 -6 42 Left Precentral Gyrus 
 4.12 -38 -20 50 Left Precentral Gyrus 
 3.49 -60 -8 16 Left Postcentral Gyrus 
 3.46 -42 -14 30 Left Postcentral Gyrus 
 5.06 62 0 8 Right Central Opercular Cortex 
 4.62 56 -6 26 Right Postcentral Gyrus 
 4.08 56 -32 24 Right Parietal Opercular Cortex
 3.62 64 -16 20 Right Postcentral Gyrus 
 3.57 58 -2 40 Right Precentral Gyrus 
 3.55 72 -18 16 Right Postcentral Gyrus 
       
 
 
